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Dogs, Domestication, and the Ego 
Gary Shapiro 
Fondly, for three bitches: Blacky, Amber, and Annie 
In Zarathustra's "On the Vision and the Riddle," three animals-a spider, a 
snake, and a dog-make significant appearances, as do three human or quasi-
human figures-Zarathustra himself, the dwarf known as the Spirit of Grav-
ity, and the shepherd who must bite off the head of the snake. Of these ani-
mals, it is the dog who receives the most extended attention. Here, in the 
passage that along with "The Convalescent" (with its eagle and serpent) is 
usually and rightly taken to be Nietzsche's most articulate and yet highly 
veiled approach to explaining the teaching of eternal recurrence, the rid-
dling vision involves animals. This is scarcely the only passage in Nietzsche 
to deal with the figure of the dog, although it is the one in which the dog 
has the most active role; frequently the name of the animal appears only in 
figurative speech. Here, even if the entire passage is a figure for the meaning 
of recurrence, the dog is as lively and noisy within the text as any of the 
other protagonists. Unfolding the vision and the riddle, or perhaps at least 
discovering what questions it asks, requires a confrontation with the figures 
of the animals and that howling dog. The parallel passage in The Gay Science 
(341) includes a demon rather than a dwarf and a spider spinning in the 
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moonlight but no dog and no shepherd choked by a snake. Let us note, 
before proceeding further, that of all these animals, it is only the dog who is 
domesticated in the "real world." Eagles and serpents may speak in fairy tales 
(or at the beginning of Genesis), but they are fundamentally without lan-
guage, although we suspect that the style of a dog's whining and whimpering 
and perhaps its howling may have something to do with its domestication. 
The need for a more subtle exploration of the role of the animal in the pre-
sentation of the thought of recurrence emerges when we realize that nowhere 
in Nietzsche's published writings is the teaching ever articulately affirmed by 
a human voice; yet in the two chapters of Zarathustra just mentioned, its dra-
matic presentation is staged with diverse animals. 1 The discussion of recur-
rence in "On the Vision and the Riddle" reaches a turning point when the 
Miirchen-like dwarf has just "murmured contemptuously 'All truth is 
crooked; time itself is a circle.'" Zarathustra's reply to this reductionistic 
oversimplification is to pose a series of questions with very little in the way 
of affirmation, his last question being "must we not eternally return?" But he 
tells his audience-the searchers, researchers, and guessers of riddles-that 
with such questions his voice became increasingly soft, for he was afraid of 
his own thoughts and the thoughts behind them. 
It is with this cessation of the voice that 
suddenly I heard a dog howl nearby. Had I ever heard a dog howl like this? My 
thoughts raced back. Yes, when I was a child, in the most distant moment of child-
hood: then I heard a dog howl like this. And I saw him too, bristling, his head up, 
trembling, in the stillest moonlight, when even dogs believe in ghosts-and I took 
pity: for just then the full moon, silent as death, passed over the house; just then it 
stood still, a round glow-still on the flat roof, as if on another's property-that 
was why the dog was terrified, for dogs believe in thieves and ghosts. And when I 
heard such howling again I took pity again. 
On one level this records an experience of deja vu. Zarathustra sees and hears 
a dog howling just as he did when he was a small child. It does not seem to 
be an identical repetition of the same experience, for the dog of childhood 
memory howled as the moon rose over a house; here there is no house and 
the moon had already risen, for the spider was spinning its web in the moon-
shine (although since we are dealing with the comparison of a vision and an 
early childhood memory recollected within that vision, we must be cautious 
when speaking of identity and comparison). So far the dog is just a marker 
of such an experience, an experience that might indicate the possibility of a 






